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National Security Deserves Better: “Odd” Recidivism
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“Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very possibly NOT
be engaged in activities that are counter to our national
1
security interests.”
I. INTRODUCTION
The government has consistently used the detention and alleged
recidivism of Guantánamo Bay (GTMO) detainees for political
purposes since the opening of the detention facility in 2002. Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense at the time, framed the government’s
narrative of GTMO as a holding place for the world’s “worst of the
2
worst.”
Despite
Secretary
Rumsfeld’s
simultaneous
acknowledgement that GTMO was filled with low-level detainees who
3
had little intelligence value, the government has continued to use
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Email from Todd Breasseale, Pub. Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Sec’y
of Def., to Jason Leopold (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:47 PM) (on file with author).
2
Richard Cheney, Vice President of the U.S., Remarks at the Gerald Ford
Journalism Awards (June, 1, 2009), available at http://press.org/newsmultimedia/videos/cspan/286727-1 (Cheney calls detainees the “worst of the worst”
at 41:17–41:19). See, e.g., MARK DENBEAUX, RUMSFELD KNEW: DOD’S “WORST OF THE
WORST” AND RECIDIVISM CLAIMS REFUTED BY RECENTLY DECLASSIFIED MEMO (2011),
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch
/upload/guantanamo-report-Rumsfeld-Knew.pdf; Mark Denbeaux et al., The
Guantánamo Detainees During Detention: Data from Department of Defense Records, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 1269 (2011).
3
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., to Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S. Central Command (Apr. 21, 2003)
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GTMO as a political talking point to garner public support for the
War on Terror and conceal its detainment of mostly innocent and
harmless detainees.
The Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research (“the
Center”), through its review of government documents, has shown
the inconsistencies in the government’s data on detainees and
continued rhetorical abuse of the rates of recidivism. Although the
Center attempts to take government documents at face value, the
government has been wildly inconsistent with its claims of recidivism.
Indeed, the government’s own public statements make clear that it is
only superficially concerned with GTMO detainees during and after
their detainment. As the government’s definition of “recidivism”
becomes increasingly elaborate, the number of recidivists necessarily
increases, and further distorts the public’s perception of GTMO. As a
perfect illustration of this point, although the number of unidentified
recidivists continues to rise, the list of those confirmed and suspected
4
recidivists who have been named has remained stagnant.
The government’s inconsistent claims of recidivism show that
the government is either incapable of accurately identifying
recidivists or not interested in being accurate. The fact that only two
5
new recidivists have been identified in the past three years reflects
the recycling of past incidents of recidivism to create a façade that
recidivism is an ongoing, significant problem. The government, by
focusing only on the stories of detainee reengagement, makes no
effort to characterize the true nature of former detainees. Just as
Secretary Rumsfeld knowingly fabricated the false notion that GTMO
was home to the worst of the worst, the government continues to
paint that same picture despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
The government’s outright disregard of the success stories of
past detainees further exacerbates the ill effects of the government’s
inaccurate reporting of recidivism. For the first time, the Center has
identified past detainees who have emerged from GTMO and
become successful businessmen, students, translators, and diplomats,
6
working to improve the world around them. These success stories,
when compared to the government’s claims of recidivism, paint a
more balanced perspective with respect to the nature of the people

(declassified in part July 9, 2010).
4
See infra apps. A.1–A.8, D.
5
See app. A.5.
6
See infra Section III.
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who were actually detained.
Had the government actually believed that GTMO was home to
dangerous criminals, the process of releasing detainees would reflect
those concerns. Its actions, however, reveal exactly the opposite. For
years, the release of detainees was linked directly to the detainees’
7
nationality, rather than to any risk-based assessment. This reaffirms
two common trends: first, GTMO recidivism has been
mischaracterized from the very beginning; and second, the
government was never seriously concerned with the risk of recidivism.
The government took a step in the right direction in March
2012, however, when the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
released a new Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly
8
Held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In this new summary, the DNI
begins to disaggregate its previously reported recidivism numbers. By
dividing the reengagement numbers by date (before and after
January 22, 2009), the DNI elucidates differences between the Bush
9
and Obama Administrations. Further, the new DNI summary details
the number of detainees characterized as “confirmed” or “suspected”
recidivists and divides those categories into former detainees who
10
have died, are in custody, or are not in custody. This new summary
informs us that fifty-five confirmed recidivists are not currently in
11
custody, while forty-four suspected recidivists are not in custody.
Though this summary is a step in the right direction towards greater

7

See infra Section VI.C.
App. A.8. Since the completion of this report, the DNI has released two
additional summaries of detainee reengagement, in September 2012 and March
2013. There is very little difference between these two summaries and the March
2012 summary, with the definitions of “terrorist,” “insurgent activities,” “confirmed,”
and “suspected” remaining the same. In the September 2012 summary, the number
of total detainees transferred increased to 602 from 599 and the number of
suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 fell from 2 to 1. In the March 2013
summary, the number of total detainees transferred increased to 603 and the
number of suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 returned to 2. See JAMES R.
CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (September 2012), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and
%20Pubs/Reports%20and%20Pubs%202012/Summary%20of%20the%20Reengage
ment%20of%20Detainees%20Formerly%20Held%20at%20GTMO.pdf; JAMES R.
CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (March 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/March%202013%20GTMO%20Reengagemen
t%20Release.pdf.
9
See infra Section VI.C.3.
10
See app. A.8.
11
Id. at 1.
8
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transparency, it leaves much to be desired, including the release of
the names of recidivists, the countries to which they were released,
why they were released, and the acts of recidivism they are alleged to
have committed.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has also taken a step in the
right direction by publicly announcing its opposition to the
prevailing practice of conflating “confirmed” and “suspected”
recidivists into a single “recidivist” category, since a former detainee
12
“suspected” of reengagement may in fact be perfectly peaceable.
Based on the government’s own intelligence, a public affairs officer
admitted that combining the “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivism
rates to reach a sum total of 27% is not appropriate because someone
on the “suspected” list could “very possibly NOT be engaged in
13
activities that are counter to our national security interests.”
The issue of the post-release conduct of GTMO detainees is a
matter of policy and political significance. If the released GTMO
detainees transitioned into peaceful private lives, it would say a great
deal about our judgment of who is dangerous and who is not.
Furthermore, it would strongly suggest that GTMO never housed the
worst of the worst. Perhaps most importantly, placing political
considerations ahead of honest review of the facts sabotages any
attempt to create effective policy.

II. METHODOLOGY AND OPEN SOURCE DATABASE
The Center’s standard practice is to utilize data gathered from
public government documents under the assumption that they are
accurate. Because the government has not produced any documents
related to non-recidivist former detainees, however, and because the
government itself relies upon press reports for information about
former detainees, this Report broadens the scope of available sources
by examining various “open-source” resources as well as relying on
public government reports. The Center designed a database to

12

See Email from Todd Breasseale, supra note 1.
Id. (“[T]his document makes a distinction between ‘Confirmed’ v.
‘Suspected.’ This is particularly relevant because there was confusion in some early
media reports conflating the two, coming up with this odd 27-28% number. To be
sure, ‘Confirmed’ is more consistent with our actual intelligence data and
‘Suspected’ is a much lower bar, triggering an additional review that is really more
akin to a sort of ‘early watch’ system. Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very
possibly NOT be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security
interests.”).
13
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compile, organize, and analyze the data regarding each of the
individuals detained in GTMO.
For the foundation of this database, the Center utilized The New
York Times’ “Guantánamo Docket” database of all 779 individuals
14
known to have been detained at GTMO since 2002. The Center’s
database collected each detainee’s name, Internment Serial Number
(ISN), citizenship, custody status, place of birth, date of birth, date
transferred from GTMO, and country to which the detainee was
transferred from the “Guantánamo Docket.” The Center also used
15
the government’s list of GTMO detainees. It then added the public
government information regarding twenty-nine named recidivists
from the government’s “Return to the Fight Fact Sheet,” including
whether, in the government’s view, the detainee was a suspected or
16
confirmed recidivist. Finally, it supplemented the database by using
open source information gathered from the Internet. In doing so,
the database collected comments from various sources, coded them
as positive, negative, or neutral, and made a determination on the
quality of the source.
In order to gather anecdotes about released GTMO detainees,
the Center conducted an Internet search of public sources. Research
fellows utilized the Center’s detainee database, which contains the
names of all detainees ever held in GTMO. The search of Internet
sources yielded public information for 208 of the 600 released
detainees. This Report is a not a comprehensive list of all public
anecdotes about released detainees. For some detainees, there is an
abundance of information regarding their lives after GTMO, not all
of which has been included. Because there is public information on
approximately one-third of all released detainees, the sample size is
significant. Of course, however, the missing two-thirds may raise
questions about its representativeness.

14

Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). Note that
throughout this Report, the Center relied upon the spellings of names of detainees
as they exists in the N.Y. Times database, rather than the spellings in the sources, to
maintain uniformity.
15
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 THROUGH MAY 15, 2006
(2006)
[hereinafter
LIST
OF
INDIVIDUALS
DETAINED],
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/may2006/d20060515%20list.pdf.
16
See app. A.5.
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III. POSITIVE POST-RELEASE DETAINEE STORIES
As detainees have been released from GTMO, many have made
public statements. For various reasons, news outlets have reported on
17
approximately one-third of all detainees released from GTMO.
Many released detainees have been able to put their experiences in
GTMO behind them and go on to live productive lives. Some have
gone on to careers and studies which include: author, spokesman for
Amnesty International, student, construction worker, researcher, call
center worker, real estate agent, landlord, lawyer, utilities company
controller, electrician, golf groundskeeper, radio commentator,
translator, and singer/rapper. Despite this reality, governmentreleased information, including the recent House Armed Services
Committee Report released by the House Majority, has focused solely
18
on detainees that have reengaged in terrorist activities post-release.
This leaves the public with an incomplete picture, as a full inquiry
into released GTMO detainees requires attention to the many success
stories. No government report has addressed the success of these
former GTMO detainees.
Many of the released detainees have been able to successfully
transition from “enemy combatant” to productive member of society.
Former detainee Khalid Sulaymanjaydh Javdh al Hubayshi (ISN 155),
for example, has described his life in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia as
“comfortably routine. On most days, he wakes before dawn, drinks
an espresso made by his wife and takes a 90-minute bus ride to his job
19
as a controller at a utilities company.” He credits his successful postrelease life to the Saudi Arabian government’s assistance in helping
20
him marry and get his job back.
One need only pause for a moment to realize how extraordinary
these accomplishments are. In a time where even the most qualified
applicants have difficulties finding work in many parts of the world,
these individuals have succeeded in the face of such a negative past.
For some former GTMO detainees, this status—“Former
17

This figure is based on research and analysis of the Center’s aforementioned
detainee database.
18
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 112TH CONG., LEAVING
GUANTANAMO: POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT 4
(Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter LEAVING GUANTANAMO], available at
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=dd0b4c6e-528e-41389755-86bae92e1cdb.
19
Faiza Saleh Ambah, Out of Guantanamo and Bitter Toward Bin Laden, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301594.html.
20
Id.
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Guantánamo Detainee”—is likely a disqualification in the eyes of
many employers. For example, three different employers terminated
Munir Bin Naseer (ISN 85) upon discovering that he had previously
21
been in GTMO. Rather than accept the futility of his position and
return to the war, Naseer persevered and found a position as a call
22
center worker in Karachi for a Chicago mortgage broker.
As released detainees return to and around the war zones, some
have chosen to work for peace and security, rather than against it.
Taj Mohammed (ISN 902), who was already fluent in four languages
prior to his detention, learned both Spanish and English during his
23
time at GTMO. Mohammed now works with American soldiers in
24
Afghanistan as a translator.
When questioned about his lack of
support for the Taliban, Mohammed responded “‘The PRT guy
[American Provincial Reconstruction Team] makes the building, the
25
school, everything.’” He continued, “‘The Taliban doesn’t make
26
Another released
anything for us. Stupid guy, the Taliban.’”
detainee, Abdul Salam Zaeef (ISN 306), is a former Afghan
ambassador to Pakistan and has been a key figure in peace talks with
27
the Taliban calling for a unity government.
Unlike Mohammed, most released detainees did not leave
GTMO with a newly gained, marketable skill. Therefore, upon their
release, some chose to pursue further training and education. Feroz
Ali Abbassi (ISN 24) earned a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in
28
Social Policy from the London School of Economics. Hafice Leqeat
21

Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Munir Naseer, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/12.
22
Id.
23
Karen Russo, Exclusive: Former Gitmo Detainee Now Working for U.S., ABC NEWS
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/International/Afghanistan/guantanamodetainee-taj-mohammed-gitmo-now-works-americans-afghanistan/story?id=9908017#
.T0HFtvGPXkp.
24
Id.
25
Id. (bracketed language inserted by reporter).
26
Id.
27
See generally Olaf Ihlau, Back from Guantanamo: Ex-Taliban Official Calls for Unity
Government in Afghanistan, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT. (Apr. 12, 2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,476403,00.html; Jason Straziuso,
Taliban and Afghan Officials Break Bread, THE AGE, Oct. 7, 2008, available at
http://news.theage.com.au/world/taliban-and-afghan-officials-break-bread20081007-4v9j.html.
28
Asim Qureshi, Cageprisoners Annual Report 2010, CAGEPRISONERS (Sept. 2,
2010), http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/reports/item/515-cageprisonersannual-report-2010. See also Carol Rosenberg, Newly Released Documents Reveal Fate of
Original Guantanamo Detainees, COLLEGE TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.ecollegetimes.com/music/newly-released-documents-reveal-fate-of-
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Manzu (ISN 139) chose to attend law school as a result of his time in
29
Others, like Ali Mohsen Salih (ISN 221), have studied
GTMO.
trades. Upon his release from GTMO, Salih studied to become an
electrician, although he has noted that it has been extremely difficult
30
for him to find a job as a former GTMO detainee.
Others have chosen more creative outlets.
Martin John
Mubanga (ISN 10007) has acknowledged that time in GTMO “made
31
me what I am—even if I’m not quite sure yet who that person is.”
Mubanga has channeled his experiences into music and hopes to
32
release his Guantánamo-inspired rap compositions. Murat Kurnaz
(ISN 61) has written a book on his experiences in GTMO, entitled
Five Years of My Life: An Innocent Man in Guantanamo, and works as a
33
city researcher in Bremen, Germany. David Hicks (ISN 2) has also
written a book on his time in GTMO, entitled Guantanamo: My
34
Journey. Most notably, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Rhuhel Ahmed
(ISNs 86, 87, and 110, respectively), commonly known as the “Tipton
Three,” have released a documentary entitled The Road to
35
Guantánamo.
Many released detainees have stated a desire to forget their
36
experiences in GTMO and move on with their lives. Khaleel Mamut
original-guantanamo-detainees-1.490710#.T0HVq_GPXko.
29
Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Hafiz Liaqat Manzoor, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/mi_services/gitmo
/detainees/16.
30
Michelle Shephard, Where Extremists Come to Play, THE STAR, Sept. 19, 2009,
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/698066. Ali Mohsen Salih is also
known as Mohsen al-Askari.
Andy Worthington, Saleh Al Zuba (ISN 503),
CAGEPRISONERS (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.cageprisoners.com/cases/guantanamobay/item/2590-saleh-al-zuba-isn-503.
31
David Rose, How I Entered the Hellish World of Guantanamo Bay, THE OBSERVER,
Feb. 5, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world
.guantanamo.
32
Id.
33
Matthew Schofield, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Murat Kurnaz, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/10; MURAT
KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN IN GUANTANAMO (2009).
34
David Hicks’ First Interview Details US Torture Allegations, INDEP. AUSTRALIA, Feb.
25, 2011, available at http://www.independentaustralia.net/2011/international/
david-hicks-first-interview-details-us-torture-allegations/.
35
Matthew Schofield, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Ruhal Ahmed, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/mi_services/gitmo/
detainees/65; David Rose, Using Terror to Fight Terror, THE OBSERVER (Feb. 25, 2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2006/feb/26/features.review.
36
See, e.g., Schofield, supra note 35; Jumah al Dossari, I’m Home, but Still Haunted
POST,
Aug.
17,
2008,
available
at
by
Guantanamo,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/
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(ISN 278), Abdulla Abdulqadure (ISN 285), Salahidin Abdulahat
(ISN 295), and Ablikim Turahun (ISN 320)—released detainees who
now work as groundskeepers at a golf course in Bermuda—have
insisted that they are not bitter about their time spent in GTMO and
37
no longer want to think about the past.
The story for the detainees released in Kuwait has been very
positive. Only Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220) does not fall into
38
this category. According to Khaled al Odah, founder of the Kuwaiti
Family Committee, the remaining nine released Kuwaiti detainees are
39
married and he believes all have children. These released detainees
are: Omar Rajab Amin (ISN 65), Nasser Najiri Amtiri (ISN 205), Saad
Madi Saad al Azmi (ISN 571), Mohammed Finaytal al Dehani (ISN
229), Abdullah Kamel Abudullah Kamal (ISN 228), Khalid Abdullah
Mishal al Mutairi (ISN 213), Fouad Mahmoud al Rabiah (ISN 551),
Abdulaziz Sayer Owain al Shammari (ISN 217), and Adel Zamel Abd
40
al Mahsen al Zamel (ISN 568).
Alif Khan (ISN 673) most poignantly states the difficulties faced
by released detainees choosing not to reengage upon their return.
After refusing an offer to join the Taliban upon his release from
GTMO, Khan stated, “[t]hey said if they got the opportunity, they
41
would kill me.” As a result, Khan has been unable to rebuild his life
in Afghanistan and has been forced to relocate away from his home
42
and his family. In the face of these types of threats and hardships, it
is impressive that so many detainees have been able to resist
engagement or reengagement.
It is remarkable to see how many former GTMO detainees have

AR2008081502985.html.
37
See generally James Whittaker, “Praise be to Allah, we are in Bermuda now”—Former
Guantanamo Bay Prisoners Swap Jumpsuits for Bermuda Shorts, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 21, 2009,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6397033/Praise-be-toAllah-we-are-in-Bermuda-now.html; Guantánamo’s Uighurs in Bermuda: Interviews and
New
Photos,
ANDY
WORTHINGTON
(June
15,
2009),
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/06/15/guantanamos-uighurs-in-bermudainterviews-and-new-photos/.
38
See infra Part VI.A.
39
E-mail from Jenifer Fenton, Freelance Journalist, to Mark Denbeaux (Feb. 11,
2012, 9:41 AM EST) (on file with author). Khaled al Odah is the father of Fouzi
Khalid Adbullah al Awda (aka Fawzi al Odah) (ISN 232). According to Ms. Fenton,
Fawzi al Odah remains held in GTMO as does one other Kuwaiti, Fayiz Al Kandari
(aka Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed al Kandari).
40
Id.
41
See Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Alif Khan, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/36.
42
Id.
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not allowed their pasts to dictate their futures. Unfortunately, these
stories have been conspicuously absent from government-released
information.
Although far less exciting than reports of
reengagement by released detainees, these positive stories are no less
revealing. A picture of detainee reengagement will never be
complete until the recidivists are contrasted with the success stories.
IV. DEFINING RECIDIVISM
A. The Changing Government Definition of Recidivism
The changing definition of detainee recidivism is just one way in
which the government masks the true picture of post-release
detainees. In a DoD news release from July 2007, “recidivism”
included those that “have returned to militant activities, participated
in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence
43
gathering and media reports.”
In this release, the government
noted that it was aware of a number of recidivists despite “not
generally track[ing] ex-GTMO detainees after repatriation or
44
resettlement.” The most recent government definition of recidivism
from the March 2012 DNI Summary is more elaborate:
Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities. Activities
such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or
insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting
a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation
forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing
terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist
operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved
in terrorist operations. It does not include mere
communications with individuals or organizations—including
other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to
terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared
experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist
associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S.
books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda
45
statements.
To be a “confirmed” case of recidivism requires “[a]
preponderance of information which identifies a specific former
GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent
43

See infra app. A.2.
See infra app. A.2.
45
See app. A.8, at 2 (emphasis added to highlight changes from previous
definitions). The 2012 definition closely resembles the definition from 2010. See
infra app. A.6.
44

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER

4/11/2013 7:43 PM

653

46

activities.”
To be considered a “suspected” recidivist requires
“[p]lausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a
specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or
47
insurgent activities.”
The newer definitions expand the scope of recidivism to include
“insurgent” activities. The 2010 and 2012 definitions also include for
the first time language involving insurgent activities that have been
alleged to have been conducted against “Coalition or host-nation
forces.” This appears to refer to the situation in Afghanistan, though
it is unclear whether the elements following this in the definition
(suicide bombings, financing terrorist operations, etc.) are also in
reference to Afghanistan. If so, this would contradict previous
reports of recidivism, which included actions carried out in other
countries, such as Russia, and which were not attacks against the
United States, the Coalition, or Afghan forces. The evolution of the
standard by which recidivism is defined is discussed below in Part
IV.B.
The 2012 summary also asserts, consistent with the government’s
April 2009 statement, that the definition of recidivism does not
consider “mere communications” or “writing anti-U.S. books or
articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements” to be recidivist
48
acts. This contradicts past reports on recidivism, which expressly
49
included anti-U.S. propaganda in the definition. In fact, the 2007
report cited as examples of anti-American behavior the “Tipton

46

See app. A.8. On its face, this would seem to be no different from “direct
participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflict. See generally NILS
MELZER, INT’L REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reportsdocuments.pdf. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, has stated,
however, that the United States is in compliance with the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) interpretive guidance, which excludes mere “recruiters,
trainers, financiers and propagandists” who have no direct nexus to hostilities, as
would planning or commanding. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, The
Obama Administration and International Law, Keynote Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Soc’y of Int’l Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (“[O]ur general
approach of looking at ‘functional’ membership in an armed group has been
endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the approach
taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation
in Hostilities (DPH).”). Koh’s statements seem to be in conflict with the DNI
definition of “confirmed” recidivist, as the DNI defines “directly involved” to include
recruiters, trainers, and financiers.
47
App. A.8.
48
App. A.8, at 2.
49
See infra app. A.
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Three” and their discussions of their experiences in GTMO for
50
Michael Winterbottom’s commercial film, The Road to Guantánamo.
Because of the government’s failure to identify individuals, however,
it remains unclear whether the government has retroactively
accounted for the change in definition and subtracted those who did
not engage in terrorist attacks, but participated only in propaganda.
In stark contrast to previous DNI summaries, the 2012 summary
51
attempts to break down the recidivism numbers in table form.
Specifically, the table lists the reengagement numbers before and
after January 22, 2009 (to coincide with an Executive Order issued by
52
President Obama). This date also coincides with President Obama
entering into office, providing a clearer view of reengagement
numbers during the Bush and Obama Administrations. Thus, since
President Obama took office, of the 67 total releases, three detainees
53
are confirmed recidivists (4.5%) while 2 are suspected (3%). Under
President Bush’s tenure, 532 detainees were released, 92 of which are
54
confirmed recidivists (17.3%), while 70 are suspected (13.2%). In
addition, the table shows that the DNI considers deceased former
55
detainees when compiling the recidivist numbers. In total, of the
599 detainees released from GTMO, 95 are listed as confirmed
56
recidivists (15.9%), while 72 are suspected recidivists (12%).
Finally, and notably, the 2010 and 2012 DNI summaries differed
57
from previous summaries because they offered an assessment of the
likelihood that detainees will “engage in terrorism” and
58
“communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.” The DNI
concluded that if additional detainees are transferred without specific
59
conditions met, “some will reengage.”
The DNI also noted that
transfers to countries with instability and ongoing conflicts pose “a
60
particular problem.” Further, the DNI acknowledged that former
GTMO detainees “routinely communicate with each other” but the
50

See infra app. A.1.
See app. A.8, at 1.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
The December 2010 summary contains similar language, though there are a
number of differences in the wording of the March 2012 summary. Compare app.
A.7, with app. A.8.
58
See app. A.8, at 2.
59
Id. (emphasis added).
60
Id.
51
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61

reasons “span from the mundane . . . to the nefarious.” In assessing
whether or not a detainee has reengaged, the DNI explains that “the
motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken
62
into account.”
B. Expansive by Definition
The language used by the government and other officials in
recent years described alleged recidivists as “returning to the
63
battlefield.” Alternatively, the issue had been framed as recidivists
64
“return[ing] to militant activities.” Beginning with the June 2008
report, the DoD started using the more general phrase “reengaging
65
in terrorism” for recidivism.
In contrast, the 2010 summary
considers activities against Coalition or host-nation forces to be acts
66
of recidivism.
This language of “reengagement,” “terrorism,”
“insurgent,” and “host-nation” retreats from the obvious earlier
implication that a detainee had to have engaged in acts against the
United States or Coalition forces for the DoD to consider him a
recidivist. This category change may have increased the number of
those qualifying recidivists.
The shift also indicates that the
government has moved away from limiting “return to the fight” in
terms of Afghanistan and Iraq. For instance, when Pentagon
spokesman Geoff Morrell discussed with reporters detainees
“returning to the fight” he stated, “[t]his is [sic] acts of terrorism. It
could be Iraq, Afghanistan, it could be acts of terrorism around the
67
world.” Whatever the legitimacy of this classification system in the
abstract, it does not address the public’s concern that detainees
released from GTMO might return to the battlefield against U.S.
soldiers.
According to the current definition, a detainee has “reengaged”
if he is directly involved in any terrorist or insurgent activities against
68
host nation or Coalition forces.
It is unclear how “host nation”
61

Id.
Id.
63
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At
least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo Bay have returned to
the battlefield.”) (emphasis added).
64
See infra app. A.2.
65
See app. A.4.
66
See infra app. A.6.
67
See David Morgan, Pentagon: 61 Ex-Guantanamo Inmates Return to Terrorism, Jan.
13, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50C5JX
20090113.
68
App. A.8, supra note 4, at 2.
62
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should be interpreted. If it means Afghanistan, then it is redundant,
since Afghanistan is listed as a member of the Coalition. If it means
the place of release or transfer, then it is extraordinarily expansive.
For example, applying this definition to the five Russian
recidivists highlights several critical flaws. First, by allowing actions by
foreign citizens against their own governments to fall under the
insurgent activities against a host country definition, the government
is greatly expanding the concept of recidivism. The Russian
recidivists were Russian citizens that the United States returned to the
Russian government, who then refused to detain or prosecute them
69
for actions related to the reason for their holding in GTMO. The
former detainees then committed acts against the Russian
70
government (in connection with the Chechnya conflict).
It is
difficult to comprehend why this scenario concerns the U.S.
government enough to qualify it as recidivism in the context of the
Coalition’s fight against al Qaeda. Though there is a supposed link
71
between Chechen rebels and al Qaeda, the in-fighting between
Russia and Chechnya is arguably unrelated to U.S. and Coalition
fears of recidivism. Further, Russia has only supplied minimal
72
support for the Coalition, so it cannot be argued that the actions of
the Russian recidivists are directed at the Coalition or United States.
Including acts against host-nations allows recidivism to
encompass much more conduct than a U.S. or Coalition-specific
definition and supports a conclusion that the government’s actual
goal is to report increasingly higher recidivism numbers. Earlier
73
reports were always framed as acts against the United States. This is
confirmed by the fact that the scope of conduct the DoD included in
69

See app. A.4.
See id.
71
Thomas de Waal, Greetings from Grozny—Fighting for Chechnya: Is Islam a Factor?,
PBS WIDEANGLE (July 25, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/
greetings-from-grozny/fighting-for-chechnya-is-islam-a-factor/3078/; see also, U.S.
Supports Work of OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, RELIEFWEB (June 7, 2002),
http://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/us-supports-work-osce-assistancegroup-chechnya (providing a transcript of the Ambassador’s statement, Org. for Sec.
& Cooperation in Eur. [OSCE], Ambassador Stephan Minikes, Statement on Chechnya,
June 6, 2002).
72
See DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR
AGAINST TERROR (June 2002) [hereinafter DOD FACT SHEET], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf.
73
See infra apps. A.1 (returned to terrorism focused on harming U.S. or allied
interests.”), A.2 (“each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies . . .”); app.
A.4 (“reengaged in local, tactical-level, anti-coalition activity” and “no indication he
was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or Allied
interests”).
70
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“returning to the fight” once extended to those former detainees who
74
had merely “spoken critically of the Government’s detention policy.”
This expansive notion of recidivism serves only to confuse policy
debates and inflame political rhetoric. Given the history of inflated
and politically-driven reporting of recidivism, as discussed below, it is
fair to ask whether the most recent definition is also politically
motivated.
V. CLAIMS OF RECIDIVISM
As detainees have been released from GTMO, government
officials have made upwards of fifty public statements regarding the
behavior of these released detainees. Senior administration officials
and members of Congress, including members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, made many of these statements orally. In
addition, the Department of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence have produced a series of written reports about releaseddetainee recidivism. This multitude of information has provided the
public with a confusing and conflicting picture. In early consecutive
reports, the number of recidivists varied from two to ten, then to
75
twelve, back down to six, and then back to two, only to rise again.
Taken together, it is clear that these statements were presented for
political advantage.

74

MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, JUSTICE SCALIA, THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND THE PERPETUATION OF AN URBAN LEGEND: THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE ALLEGED RECIDIVISM OF RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES 6 (2008),
available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/urban_legend
_final_63008.pdf.
75
See infra app. B.
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Th
he governm
ment first released a fo
ormal statem
ment regard
ding
76
alleged
d recidivists in
i 2006 and
d received litttle attention
n. It madee its
next written
w
reporrt in July 2007—a formaal statementt that admittted
that th
he DoD had not bothere
ed to keep ttrack of releeased detain
nees
77
up unttil that point. Another statement followed th
he breathtak
king
July 20
007 statemen
nt. It indicatted that the evidence th
hat government
relied upon was almost
a
exclu
usively open
n source intelligence—
—the
78
media. Instead of
o keeping track of thee “worst of tthe worst,” the
govern
nment sat bacck and left th
his role to th
he media.
With respect to its prevvious numb
bers of claiimed recidiivist
detaine
ees, the Do
oD has alleged varioussly: one, sevveral, somee, a
couple, a few, fivve, seven, te
en, twelve tto twenty-fou
ur, twenty-ffive,
79
hirty—not in
n that order.. More reccently, the D
DoD
twenty--nine, and th
has claaimed that siixty-one form
mer detaine es have “retturn[ed] to the
80
fight.”
In Aprril 2009, th
he DoD claaimed
sevventy-four h
had
81
reengaaged. As intterpreted byy the House A
Armed Serviices Committtee
76

Seee infra app. A.1
1.
Seee infra app. A.2
2 (although the U.S. governm
ment does not generally track
k exGTMO detainees
d
after repatriation orr resettlement, the Center is aaware of dozen
ns of
cases wh
here they havve returned to
o militant actiivities, particip
pated in anti-U
U.S.
propaganda, or other activities
a
throug
gh intelligence gathering and media reports).
78
Seee app. A.4 (all information regarding
r
indivvidual released detainees is listed
under th
he heading “O
Open-Source Reporting
R
Iden
ntifies Detaineees Reengaging
g in
Terrorism
m”).
79
Seee infra app. B.
80
Seee Morgan, suppra note 67 (“Pentagon spo
okesman Geofff Morrell said
d 18
former detainees
d
are co
onfirmed as ‘re
eturning to the fight.’”).
81
Seee app. A.5 (“O
Of the more thaan 530 Guantan
namo detaineees transferred fr
from
Departm
ment of Defense
e custody at Gu
uantanamo Bayy, 27 were confiirmed and 47 w
were
suspected of reengagin
ng in terrorist acctivity.”).
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(HASC), the December 2010 summary stated that 150 detainees have
82
A more recent
reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities.
statement claimed that 161 of the 599 released detainees have
83
reengaged, amounting to 27%. The HASC then published a report
84
A DoD spokesman, however, recently
reiterating this claim.
characterized this as an “odd” conflation of two distinct categories,
85
and indicated that the most recent trustworthy rate is 15.9%.
Furthermore, a timeline of publicly cited numbers reveals sudden,
unexplained spikes and decreases, as well as a large and persistent
discrepancy between the number cited by public officials and actual
names of those detainees “confirmed” as having committed post86
release terrorist acts.
A. The Government Can Only Name Fifteen “Confirmed” Recidivists,
but Not All Were Detained At GTMO and Not All Engaged in PostDetention Attacks Against the United States or Coalition Forces
The various DoD statements regarding the number of recidivist
detainees consistently fail to identify the overwhelming majority of
alleged recidivists, and these statements have proven particularly
unreliable in the past. For example, in the July 12, 2007 DoD press
release, the recidivist figure reported by the DoD in April 2007 of
87
thirty was reduced to five.
Specifically, in that report, the DoD
identified seven prisoners by name, but two of those seven were never
88
in GTMO.

82

LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18 at 10 (“It was reported as 25 percent
(150 detainees) [had reengaged] as of October 2010.”)
83
See app. A.7.
84
LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
85
Todd Breasseale, supra note 1; app. A.8, at 1.
86
See infra app. B.
87
See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, RELEASED
GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: PROPAGANDA BY THE
NUMBERS? 4 (2009) [hereinafter PROPAGANDA BY THE NUMBERS], available at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/propaganda_numbers_11509
.pdf.
88
Id.
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Government Figures for Recidivist Detainees
from 3/16/04 - 9/13/11:
Number Alleged to be Recidivist

Mar-04
May-04
Jul-04
Sep-04
Nov-04
Jan-05
Mar-05
May-05
Jul-05
Sep-05
Nov-05
Jan-06
Mar-06
May-06
Jul-06
Sep-06
Nov-06
Jan-07
Mar-07
May-07
Jul-07
Sep-07
Nov-07
Jan-08
Mar-08
May-08
Jul-08
Sep-08
Nov-08
Jan-09
Mar-09
May-09
Jul-09
Sep-09
Nov-09
Jan-10
Mar-10
May-10
Jul-10
Sep-10
Nov-10
Jan-11
Mar-11
May-11
Jul-11
Sep-11

170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

The April 2009 “Fact Sheet” from the DoD reviewed “specific
cases” which were identified in the May 2008 DoD report. This list is
notable for several reasons, all of which raise concerns regarding the
consistency, strength, and accuracy of the DoD’s recidivism claims.
The April 2009 DoD report, using data from May 2008, asserted that
twenty-seven former GTMO detainees had been confirmed as
“reengaging in terrorist activities” and an additional forty-seven were
89
“suspected” of reengaging in terrorist activity. Of the seventy-four
alleged recidivists, however, the DoD provided names for only twentynine detainees. Of those twenty-nine names, only fifteen were
90
“confirmed” as recidivists, at least according to the government. Of
the fifteen “confirmed,” one does not appear on the list of detainees
91
in GTMO.
Further, two were Russian nationals whose postdetention activities occurred in Russia with no ostensible connection
92
the United States. After the May 2008 data, the government has not
identified by name or ISN any additional alleged recidivists until the
93
HASC Report released by the House Majority.
89

See app. A.5.
See id.
91
Compare id., with LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15.
92
See app. A.4. The nationalities of named “confirmed” detainees who can be
verified as former GTMO detainees are: Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia (3); Morocco,
Russia (2); Kuwait (1), Turkey (1), Bahrain (1), Pakistan (1). LIST OF INDIVIDUALS
DETAINED, supra note 15.
93
LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18. See also apps. A.4–A.8.
90
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B. A Pattern of Errors
The U.S. government has been releasing names of former
GTMO detainees deemed to be recidivists since 2006. While a total
of thirty-one detainees have been identified as recidivists, only two
additional names (Medhi Mohammad Ghezali (ISN 166) and
Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN 184)) have been
94
identified since 2009. The remaining lists of detainees (released in
2006, 2007, May 2008, June 2008, and 2009) are highly repetitive.
While each time the government presents its information as new, it
has failed or refused to identify most of the claimed recidivists, thus
frustrating any efforts at independent verification of the claims.
Five detainees have been on each of the government’s lists from
2006 to 2009. Mohammed Ismail, Mohammed Yusif Yaqub (aka
Mullah Shazada), Shai Jahn Ghafoor (aka Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar),
and Mohammed Nayim Farouq all appear on the 2006, 2007, May
95
2008, June 2008, and 2009 recidivists lists.
Abdullah Mahsud
appears on the 2007, June 2008, and 2009 lists under that name, and
on the July 2006, May 2008, and 2009 lists as Said Mohammed Alim
96
Shah.
While the 2007 list identified seven alleged recidivists, only two
97
men (Noor and Odijev) had not appeared on previous lists. At the
same time, two others previously identified were omitted. Similarly,
the May 2008 list included a dozen names, yet only five had not
98
appeared on earlier lists, and one of the 2007 additions was omitted.
In June 2008 the government released a list of thirteen alleged
99
None of these thirteen men were newly identified
recidivists.
recidivists. In fact, seven of them were included on the first list
100
released in 2006.
A subsequent list of alleged recidivists was released in April 2009,
which identified twenty-nine former detainees who had reengaged in
101
terrorism.
This was the most significant step forward since fifteen
were newly identified and had not appeared on earlier lists.
Nevertheless, it remains true that the vast majority of claimed

94

LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
See infra apps. A.1–A.5 (but note in A3 that Mullah Shazada is listed by an alias
Mohamed Yusif Yaqub).
96
See infra apps. A.1–A.5.
97
See infra app. A.2.
98
See infra app. A.3.
99
See app. A.4.
100
See infra app. A.1.
101
See app. A.5.
95
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recidivists have not been named and therefore their statuses cannot
be verified. The government claims there are high numbers of
GTMO detainees who have reengaged in terrorism, yet it continues
to release inconsistent lists of recidivists using old data and stale
information.
The use of stale data is troubling for a number of reasons. First,
the reliance on stale recidivism data to assert that recidivism is an
ongoing problem mischaracterizes the perceived threat. Including
past recidivists on a list of current recidivists conflates two distinctly
different problems—one a past problem of recidivism, the other a
current recidivism problem. In this regard, rather than assessing the
total number of recidivists, the appropriate inquiry should focus on
how many new recidivists there are. After all, policy reflects perceived
102
future threat.
If the government discovered the bulk of recidivists
years ago, then the threat of recidivism looks relatively minor. If the
government discovers new recidivists but does not announce them,
then the threat is that much greater.
The DNI has hinted at this point on several occasions by noting
the fact that the overall recidivism rate (whether suspected or
103
confirmed) includes those who are dead or captured. These hints
have apparently been insufficient to affect policymakers’ views of the
risk involved in releasing GTMO detainees, as demonstrated by the
HASC report’s aggregation of all confirmed and suspected recidivists
104
into a single recidivism rate. The DNI’s failure to parse in full the
recidivist data leads to the overestimation of risk. This problem could
be solved by an indication of the estimated future risk, though no
government agency has attempted to do this to date.
Second, the use of stale data reaffirms the notion that the
government is superficially concerned about the post-release
behavior of detainees. The cumulative effect of recycling old data
distorts the public’s perception of how bad the recidivism rate
actually is. The exaggeration of the recidivism problem,
accomplished through the use of stale data, is consistent with the
government’s exploitation of information for political gain. In short,
claiming a high rate of recidivism is a continuation of the
government’s assertion that GTMO housed the “worst of the worst.”

102

App. A.8 (DNI is tasked with providing an unclassified summary of: “an
assessment of the likelihood that [current or formerly held] detainees will engage in
terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.”) (emphasis
added).
103
See, e.g., app. A.7; see also app. A.8.
104
See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/11/2013 7:43 PM

NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER

663

Also troubling are the internal inconsistencies of the lists
provided. Each of the DoD’s four lists of names differs widely from
the others in ways that cannot be explained by the passage of time.
In terms of “confirmed” names, the number of names has remained
within the range of seven to fifteen, while the alleged total, mostly
105
comprised of unnamed individuals, has grown disproportionately.
Often, individual names are spelled inconsistently. Only five of the
106
detainees appear on all five lists, and of those five, two (Mohammed
Nayim Farouq and Ruslan Odijev (aka Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev))
are among the three detainees downgraded to “suspected” status in
107
the April 2009 report.
Thus, only three of the seven originally
“confirmed” recidivists are consistently “confirmed.” These status
changes call into question the accuracy of every previous list, since
they directly contradict them all.
Three of the cases discussed in the April 2009 DoD report reflect
a major reversal from its previous report. Specifically, the statuses of
at least three former detainees were changed from “confirmed
reengagement” to “suspected reengagement.” This is significant
because “unverified or single-source . . . reporting” is sufficient to
classify a person as “suspected” of “reengaging in terrorist
108
activities.”
Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (aka “Ruslan Odizhev”): Ruslan
Odijev, a Russian, was reportedly killed in a June 2007 battle
with Russia’s federal Security Service. Russian authorities
stated that Odijev participated in several terrorist acts,
including an attack in October 2005 in the Caucasus region.
His status as “returned to the fight” has been changed,
109
without explanation, to “suspected reengagement.”
Shai Jahn Abdul Ghafoor (aka “Maulvi Abdul Ghaffar”):
Ghaffar was reportedly “killed in a raid by Afghan security
forces” in September 2004. The DoD reports that Ghaffar
became the Taliban’s regional commander in the Uruzgan
and Helmand provinces and carried out attacks against U.S.
and Afghan forces. As of the April 2009 DoD report,
however, Ghaffar’s status has been changed from “returned
110
In addition, as previously
to the fight” to “suspected.”
105
106
107
108
109
110

Compare infra apps. A.1–A.8, with infra app. B.
See app. C.
App. A.5.
See app. A.4; app. A.5.
Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5.
Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5.
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reported by the Center, his name does not appear on the
list of detainees in GTMO. While there are two detainees
with similar names, both were still imprisoned when
111
Ghaffar was allegedly killed.
Mohammed Nayim Farouq: According to the Department
of Defense, Farouq, who was released from GTMO before
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) were
convened, “has since become re-involved in anti-coalition
militant activity,” but has neither been recaptured nor
112
killed.
These former detainees were changed from “confirmed” to
“suspected” without comment. It is unclear why, considering that a
July 2007 news release from the DoD listed each of the above three
detainees as examples of those who “returned to combat against the
113
U.S. and its allies after being released from [GTMO].” Presumably,
these individuals are included in the total of seventy-four reported in
the April 2009 DoD report and in the December 2010 summary.
Given this fact, the flux between these two categories of recidivism
and the public concern of the overall number asserted by the DoD
creates a serious question as to the consistency of reporting on
recidivism.
Indeed, this change in status can only reflect one of two
possibilities: (1) either these detainees were always merely
“suspected” recidivists previously reported as “confirmed,” or (2) the
DoD has found cause to doubt its own previous evidence upon which
the “confirmed” status was based. An additional detainee, Abdul
Rahman Noor, appeared in the first list in July 2007:
Abdul Rahman Noor: The DoD previously claimed that
Noor participated in fighting against U.S. forces near
Kandahar. The DoD described Noor as participating in a
video interview with al-Jazeera television, wherein he was
114
identified as the “deputy defense minister of the Taliban.”
As of the April 7, 2009 report, Noor is no longer listed as a
115
This may indicate
recidivist—neither confirmed nor suspected.
that the DoD agrees with earlier assertions that Mr. Noor was not
111

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15.
See app. A.5. Those that are dead or captured are noted as such under
“Activity”; because Farouq’s activity indicates neither, it can be presumed that the
government believes he is not dead or captured.
113
See infra app. A.2.
114
See app. A.4.
115
See app. A.5.
112
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116

“ever officially detained at Guantánamo.”
In any event, this
additional DoD shift further raised serious questions regarding the
consistency and accuracy of the DoD allegations, and has not been
explained in the most recent summary.
In addition, the DoD maintained another inconsistency
described in earlier reports:
Mohammed Yusif Yaqub (aka Mullah Shazada): According
to the Department of Defense, Mullah Shazada “was killed
117
The name
on 7 May 2004 fighting against U.S. forces.”
Mullah Shazada, however, does not appear on the official
118
list of detainees.
It is not at all clear that Shazada is actually a former GTMO
119
detainee.
After Shazada’s death, the government announced that
he had been previously detained in GTMO under the name
120
“Mohamed Yusif Yaqub.”
In the July 2007 DoD news release, the five Uighurs—ethnic
Chinese who practice Islam—relocated to Albania were listed as
121
examples of former detainees engaging in recidivist activity.
No
press release from the DoD since has retracted that earlier assertion.
However, first-hand accounts dispute this allegation. Hidajet Cera,
director of the refugee camp to which the Uighers were sent,
described the former detainees as “the best guys in the place” who
122
“have never given us one minute’s problem.” The five Uighers no
longer live in the refugee camp, and local news reports indicate that
each one is living relatively normal lives, such as working as a pizza123
maker. Further, the U.S. has admitted in open court that none of
the Uighurs detained in GTMO are threats to national security, and

116

See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, THE MEANING OF
“BATTLEFIELD”: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S REPRESENTATIONS OF “BATTLEFIELD”
CAPTURE AND “RECIDIVISM” OF THE GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES 12 (2007), available at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/meaning_of_battlefield_final
_121007.pdf.
117
See app. A.5.
118
LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15.
119
See PROPAGANDA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 87, at 5.
120
See app. A.5.
121
See infra app. A.2.
122
Jonathan Finer, After Guantanamo, An Empty Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 17,
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
10/16/AR2007101602078.html.
123
Nate Tabak, Former Guantánamo Detainee Now Making Pizza in Albania, PRI’S
THE WORLD (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.theworld.org/2013/02/uighur-guantanamodetainee-albania/.
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all but three have been released.
One of the Uighur men, however, did write an opinion piece,
published in The New York Times, in which he urged American
125
lawmakers to protect habeas corpus. This may be the basis of listing
the Uighurs as recidivists since the DoD has sometimes designated
126
political opposition as “anti-coalition militant activity.”
Additionally, in November 2010 a former detainee, Jaber Jubran
al-Faifi (ISN 188), reportedly tipped off Yemeni officials to a bomb
plot involving devices planted in printer cartridges and sent via air
127
cargo. Al-Faifi was incarcerated at GTMO until 2007, when he was
repatriated to Saudi Arabia. He reportedly rejoined al Qaeda and
made his way to Yemen, before turning himself in November and
reporting the bombing plot.
Under the definition of recidivism in the 2012 DNI summary, alFaifi was likely counted as reengaging in terrorist activities after he
was said to have rejoined al Qaeda. The summary does not make
clear whether blowing the whistle on a terrorist bombing plot would
remove al-Faifi from the ranks of recidivists. Because the summary
does not list names of suspected or confirmed recidivists, al-Faifi’s
status in this count is unknown.
Hajji Sahib Rohullah Wakil (ISN 798), an Afghani released from
GTMO in April 2008, was classified as a recidivist by the government
128
on its 2009 list of recidivist detainees. Wakil’s alleged recidivist act,
however, is a mere loose association with al Qaeda as a result of his
political activities, not terroristic acts. Wakil is a tribal leader in
Afghanistan, who works closely with the Afghani government to
129
advocate for the needs of his home province, Kunar province. He
works with the country’s president, Karzai, who has nothing but
130
praise for Wakil.

124

Charlie Savage, Two Guantánamo Detainees Freed, the First in 15 Months, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/
americas/2-guantanamo-bay-detainees-freed-in-el-salvador.html.
125
Abu Bakker Qassim, The View From Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/opinion/17qassim.html.
126
See infra app. A.2.
127
See, e.g., Yemen Tip-Off Came from Ex-Gitmo Detainee, Officials Say, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39947157/ns/us_news-security/
#.USPpVaV9BWw.
128
See app. A.5.
129
Nancy A. Youssef, Where’s Pentagon “terrorism suspect”? Talking to Karzai,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (July 7, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/07/
71434/wheres-pentagon-terrorism-suspect.html.
130
Id.
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Similarly, the government has identified Mehdi Mohammad
Ghezali (ISN 166) as a recidivist and Pakistani officials arrested him
because of his alleged ties to al Qaeda, claiming that a local police
131
chief had referred to him as “a very dangerous man.” In late 2009,
however, it was reported that Ghezali’s arrest was a
misunderstanding, and he had been part of a group making a
pilgrimage to celebrate Ramadan, and was arrested with a fellow
132
Swedish couple and their two-year-old son.
Without speculating as to what conclusions might be drawn from
these types of inconsistencies, they are typical of the DoD releases.
None is free from error.
VI. GOVERNMENT METHODS OF DETAINEE RELEASE HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO RECIDIVISM
A. The Worst Error
In gaining a fuller picture of the post-release behavior of former
GTMO detainees, it is not necessary to diminish the role of those who
do in fact reengage in criminal and militant activity hostile to U.S.
interests. The dangerous nature of some detainees is a reason for
fully informed policy debate. Indeed, lacking such debate, the
government’s policy decisions have led to the release of some
individuals for whom reengagement seems inevitable. Some of the
more compelling cases are included below.
Unsurprisingly, many alleged recidivists are Afghans taking
direct part in the civil war in Afghanistan. Abdullah Mehsud (ISN
133
92) returned to Afghanistan on March 14, 2004. It is unclear why
134
the U.S. released Mehsud, a known Taliban fighter, who “quickly
took up arms again, leading local and foreign militants in Pakistan’s

131

LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 35.
David Jonasson, Swedish Former Guantanamo Prisoner Arrested in Pakistan,
STOCKHOLM NEWS (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?
NID=3945#; David Landes, Lawyers Explain Pakistan Trip by ‘Guantanamo Swede,’ THE
LOCAL (Sweden) (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.thelocal.se/23416/20091123
/#.URxuT6V9BWw.
133
Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket: Abdullah Mehsud, N.Y.
TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/92-abdullah-mehsud
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
134
If the US Administration had Behaved Intelligently, Ex-Guantánamo Inmate who Blew
Himself Up Would Never have been Released, ANDY WORTHINGTON (July 24, 2007),
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2007/07/24/if-the-us-administration-hadbehaved-intelligently-ex-guantanamo-inmate-who-blew-himself-up-would-never-havebeen-released/.
132
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135

South Waziristan[.]”
According to the government, Mehsud blew
136
137
himself up with a hand grenade to avoid capture in July 2007.
138
Mohamed Yusif Yaqub, aka Mullah Shazada (ISN 367), was
139
supposedly released to Afghanistan in May 2003. The government
lists him as a confirmed recidivist and Taliban commander in
Afghanistan who organized a jailbreak in Kandahar and was killed in
140
May 2004 fighting U.S. forces. Yaqub reportedly used a fake name
141
in GTMO and claimed to be an innocent rug merchant. After his
release, he seized control of Taliban operations in south Afghanistan,
142
recruiting fighters by telling tales of mistreatment in GTMO.
The government released Abdullah Gulam Rasoul (ISN 8) to
Afghanistan in December 2007. Rasoul is listed as a suspected
recidivist and Taliban military commander for Afghanistan who
143
organized an assault on U.S. military aircraft in Afghanistan.
Another source reports that Rasoul, under the name Mullah
Abdullah Zakir, is a top operations officer for the Taliban in southern
144
Afghanistan.
Several other alleged recidivists are Saudis who were subject to
Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program but thereafter purportedly
traveled to Yemen to join al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(“AQAP”). For example, Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN
184), a citizen of Yemen, was repatriated to Saudi Arabia on June 24,
145
2006, and was put through the Saudi rehabilitation program.
He
135

Abdul Sattar, Pakistani Militant Leader Is Killed, WASH. POST, July 24, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/24
/AR2007072400521.html.
136
The government document does not say how he killed himself, but this source
specifies he killed himself with a hand grenade. Id.
137
See app. A.5.
138
See infra app. A.1.
139
It is still unclear whether Mohammed Yusif Yaqub also went by Mullah
Shazada.
140
See app. A.5.
141
WikiLeaks and the Guantánamo Prisoners Released from 2002 to 2004 (Part Five of
Ten), ANDY WORTHINGTON (July 25, 2011), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011
/07/25/wikileaks-and-the-guantanamo-prisoners-released-from-2002-to-2004-partfive-of-ten/. Wikileaks’ information was not used for this report, nor is the
information taken from Worthington’s article based on Wikileaks’ information.
142
Id.
143
See app. A.5.
144
Pamela Hess, Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul, Former Gitmo Detainee, Now A Taliban
Leader, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03
/10/abdullah-ghulam-rasoul-fo_n_173690.html.
145
Andy Worthington, Othman Al Ghamdi (ISN 184), CAGEPRISONERS (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.cageprisoners.com/cases/guantanamo-bay/item/2526-othman-
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soon disappeared, and in February 2009 he was included as one of
eleven former GTMO prisoners on the Saudi most wanted militant
146
In May 2010, an al Qaeda video featured al Omairah,
list.
147
describing him as an “operational commander.”
Mazin Salih Musaid al Awfi (ISN 154) and Said Ali al Shihri (ISN
148
372) are alleged leadership figures in AQAP.
According to one
source, Yemeni authorities arrested al Awfi in 2009 after he appeared
149
Al Shihri has yet to be captured and is
in a video with al Shihri.
150
believed to be the deputy leader of AQAP.
He may have been
involved in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen in September
151
2008.
Among those recidivists not named on the government’s various
lists but discovered by the Center from public sources are Saudis
Yusef Mohammed Mubarak al Shihri (ISN 114), Fahd Salih Sulayman
al Jutavyli (ISN 177), and Ibrahim Sulayman Arbaysh (ISN 192).
Yusef al Shihri, brother-in-law of Said al Shihiri (ISN 372), was
reportedly killed by Saudi forces crossing from Yemen to Saudi
Arabia, while disguised as a woman and wearing a suicide bomb
152
belt.
The Saudi Interior Ministry reported that DNA tests had
confirmed that al Jutayli, released in 2007, was one of the several
153
militants killed on September 14, 2009, when a bomb under
154
construction accidentally detonated.
Arbaysh was placed in a
reintegration program, but traveled to Yemen and is now reportedly a

al-ghamdi-isn-184.
146
Id.
147
Id. See also Thomas Joscelyn, Former Gitmo Detainee Featured as Commander in al
Qaeda Tape, LONG WAR J. (May 28, 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives
/2010/05/former_gitmo_detaine_4.php.
148
See app. A.5.
149
Yemen Arrests al Qaeda Member Once Held at Gitmo, CNN WORLD (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-18/world/al.qaeda.arrest_1_qaeda-saudi-arabiafacility-at-guantanamo-bay.
150
Thomas Joscelyn, Saudi Gitmo Recidivists, LONG WAR J. (June 21, 2010),
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/saudi_gitmo_recidivi.php.
151
Russell Goldman, Does Rehab for Terrorists Work?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/International/guantanamo-release-saudi-rehab-ali-al-shihrinow/story?id=9458164#.T0reHIeuafg.
152
CTC SENTINEL (Jan. 2010 Special Issue), at 2, available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CTCSentinel-YemenSI2009.pdf.
153
Ministry: 3 Saudi Militants Killed in Blast Abroad, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 18, 2010),
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2010825549_apmlsaudimilitants.html.
154
Biography of Abu Yaqin al-Qassimi (Fahd bin Saleh al-Jutaili), AL-MALAHEM MEDIA
(June 22, 2011, 8:33 PM), http://aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=8421.
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155

senior ideologue and theologian for AQAP.
In addition to the Saudi recidivists, other Arab states have seen
recidivists. For example, Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220), was a
Kuwaiti released in November 2005. After his repatriation, al Ajmi
married and had a child, but within three years conducted a suicide
bombing in Mosul, Iraq that resulted in the deaths of numerous
156
Iraqis.
Two of five Russians listed by the government as either
confirmed or suspected recidivists, Ravil Shafeyavich Gumarov (ISN
203) and Timur Ravilch Ishmurat (ISN 674), were alleged to have
been involved in the bombing of a natural gas pipeline within one
157
year of their release.
Another, Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (ISN
158
211), was reportedly killed while resisting arrest.
The reengagement of these individuals and others, and the
death and damage that resulted, may have been greatly reduced if
the government had conducted proper risk assessment and made
release contingent upon such assessment. Instead, as described
below, most releases appear to have been based upon diplomatic and
political expediency.
B. Wishful Thinking: False Hope of Continued Detention or
Prosecution
159

The HASC Report,
while failing to contribute to our
knowledge of the recidivism rates or provide new information
regarding former GTMO detainees, does point out the failures and
the confusion regarding the transfer of detainees out of GTMO. The
report outlines the chaotic situation that existed as the U.S.
government attempted to rid itself of some detainees and relieve the
diplomatic pressure from abroad, and shows how various department

155

Thomas Joscelyn, Former Guantanamo Detainee Now al Qaeda in Arabian
Peninsula’s Mufti, LONG WAR J. (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2009/12/former_guantanamo_de_1.php.
156
Identification of Ex-Guantánamo Suicide Bomber Unleashes Pentagon Propaganda,
ANDY WORTHINGTON (May 11, 2008), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2008/05
/11/identification-of-ex-guantanamo-suicide-bomber-unleashes-pentagonpropaganda/; see app. A.5.
157
Peter Finn, Russian Homeland No Haven for Ex-Detainees, Activists Say, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/02/AR2006090200452.html.
158
C.J. Shivers, Former Guantanamo Detainee is Killed in Shoot-Out in Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/
europe/27iht-27russ.6369738.html.
159
See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
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and sometimes individuals within those departments were working
toward different goals in the transfer of detainees out of GTMO.
While the DoD was focused on minimizing the risk of making
the “disastrous mistake” of releasing a detainee with “the potential for
killing Americans . . . or who had significant intelligence value yet to
160
be exploited,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was pushing
to transfer detainees to other countries for further detention and/or
161
prosecution.
There was a process agreed upon between the State and Defense
162
Departments on how to proceed with detainee transfers.
Since
some detainees were released with orders from Secretary Rumsfeld,
however, each country that received detainees did so under different
restrictions and terms, and sometimes over the objections of the CIA,
163
the Pentagon, and the Department of Justice.
After seven detainees were released to Russia, the Defense
Intelligence Agency placed five on the confirmed reengagement
164
list. The HASC Report states that “the finalized transfer agreement
included three principal clauses: the detainees would be prosecuted
in Russian courts; they would remain incarcerated until the end of
America’s involvement in Afghanistan; and that American officials
165
could have access to them at any time.” The officials interviewed by
the committee reported that Russia was to prioritize prosecution and
166
not mere legal detention —neither happened until after a 2005
attack on a natural gas pipeline.
The HASC Report also ties the release of many detainees
without proper screening to the pressure placed on the U.S. from
both abroad and domestic sources. It is also stressed that the U.S.
released detainees to certain countries in order to improve relations
167
with those countries, specifically Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K.
The Majority Report stresses pressure from abroad and from
within the U.S. as the major reason behind the transfer of the
majority of detainees from GTMO. The report, however, glosses over
the fact that Secretary Rumsfeld’s goal of transferring detainees in
2003 was to shift detainees out of GTMO to be held or tried by other
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

See id. at 21.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 2526.
Id. at 2640.
Id. at 35.
See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 44.
See Id. at 44.
See Id. at 33.
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countries, even though knowledgeable officials in his own
department believed that detention of some detainees in GTMO was
168
never warranted. While the Secretary of Defense, however, trusted
the legal systems of the receiving countries enough to transfer
detainees without proper evaluation, the DoD does not trust the legal
system of the very same countries enough to exclude detainees they
have acquitted from its recidivism lists.
C. Releases Based on Diplomacy or Security?
Because GTMO detainee releases prior to 2006 were made on
the basis of nationality rather than factors more appropriate to the
estimation of risk, the recidivism rate of this group represents an
ideal base-line roughly equivalent to randomized releases. Therefore,
a change in release determinations based upon legitimate risk
assessments will likely lower the overall recidivism rate. Additionally,
risk assessment processes may be used to reduce the incidence of
recidivism by providing the law enforcement and intelligence
communities with information that aids in the handling of released
detainees.
A threshold question to consider is what is meant by a recidivism
rate. As is evident from the government’s own “[d]efinition of
‘Terrorist’ or ‘Insurgent’ Activities,” not all reengagement in anti169
American activity stands on equal footing.
While this definition
excludes many lesser forms of reengagement from consideration, it
does not draw a distinction between highly damaging activities, such
as direct involvement in terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and
interests, and less damaging activities, such as recruitment or
propaganda for groups targeting third-party nations. For the
purposes of this analysis, “risk” will be defined in line with the
168
169

Id.

See Id. at 28.
See infra app. A.6.
For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following
indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning
terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against
Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide
bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist
operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist
operations, etc. It does not include mere communications with
individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO
detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as
reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with
past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S.
books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.
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government’s usage: the likelihood of engagement in a defined set of
activities. Risk assessments made along both axes, likelihood and
magnitude, will naturally be more useful in improving outcomes and
reducing costs in post-detention management.
1. Releases Disregarded Recidivism Risk Until At Least
2007
In August 2008, the Center for Policy & Research published its
Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s Story Then and
Now, a report analyzing which GTMO detainees were to be released
170
between early 2002 and late 2006.
That report found that,
although the U.S. government kept track of several criteria that it
claimed bear on detainee “dangerousness” in one form or another,
the actual pattern of releases was based solely upon the nationality of
171
the detainee.
It is impossible to know the reason for this pattern of releases
172
from the data that is publicly available.
It is possible the
government believed nationality was the most reasonable measure of
future dangerousness, despite its collection of other data. It is more
reasonable to assume, however, that this pattern was due in large part
to diplomatic pressure and expediency. For example, detainees from
traditional U.S. allies were released on average one year earlier than
nationals of post-Soviet nations, who were in turn released ten
173
months earlier than Arab nationals were.
This trend reflects the
general levels of influence that each of these groups wields over the
U.S., as well as the levels of cooperation in the decade after 9/11.
As another example, Pakistani and Afghani detainees were
released much earlier than other nationalities. In the case of
Afghanistan, the number of detainees actually released rather than
sent home for continued incarceration indicates that this was largely
174
due to mistaken identity—an effect of the fog of war. In the case of
175
Pakistan, however, the high rate of continued incarceration
170

See generally MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, PROFILE OF
RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY THEN AND NOW (2008)
[hereinafter THEN AND NOW], available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/
guantanamoReports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf.
171
Id. at 30.
172
Data published on wikileaks.org is not included in this analysis, due to the
Justice Department’s interpretation of a court-issued protective order by which the
author is bound.
173
See THEN AND NOW, supra note 170, at 27.
174
Id. at 20.
175
Id. at 21.
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indicates that the early releases were likely one of the many
bargaining devices used to secure Pakistan’s continued cooperation
in the War on Terror.
The cases of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian detainees provide
further examples. The early release of Saudi detainees relative to
176
other Arabic-speaking nations is likely a result of Saudi Arabian oil
177
wealth and the country’s key role in the War on Terror. Yemen, by
contrast, is a poor, weak nation beset by its own Islamist radicals (now
AQAP). Thus, it is not surprising that Yemeni detainees have been
178
the group least likely to be released.
It is therefore apparent that diplomatic expedience was the
primary factor in determining which detainees would be released in
the period between GTMO’s opening and the publication of the
release data in late 2006.
2. The Government Has at Hand Criteria that More
Accurately Estimate Risk of Recidivism than Nationality
There are factors other than nationality known to the
government that could have more accurately estimated the risk of
recidivism. Indeed, significant differences exist between detainees
that are very likely beneficial to estimating this risk with relatively
high rates of accuracy, including at a minimum the information
obtained during the CSRT process.
With the exception of 201 detainees released prior to the CSRT
process, data is available for all detainees regarding their suspected
affiliations with terrorist/insurgent groups, how they are connected
to that organization, and the number of hostile acts committed
individually against the United States prior to detention. This data
was originally published by the DoD in the Unclassified Summaries of
the Classified Evidence (“R1”), used to support the detention of each
detainee during the CSRT process.
In addition, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West
Point published a report in July 2007 that drew even finer distinctions
179
between the types of acts alleged on the R1. The CTC found that

176

Id. at 22.
See, e.g., AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 129–34 (2010); AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO
CHAOS 111, 161, 186, 233 (2008); SEAN M. MALONEY, ENDURING THE FREEDOM: A
ROGUE HISTORIAN IN AFGHANISTAN 21 (2005).
178
See THEN AND NOW, supra note 170, at 23.
179
JOSEPH FELTER & JARRET BRACHMAN, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., AN
ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARIES 34 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Organizations
177
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the information on the R1 could be classified into twelve factors in
three categories (high, medium, and low risk). Their factors include
such information as training camp attendance, combat weapons
training, commitment to violent jihad, small arms training, and
operationally relevant travel. While the CTC’s analysis of this
180
information is somewhat suspect, such fine granulation is useful in
assessing risk in terms of both likelihood and magnitude.
It should be emphasized that the above examples make use only
of the publicly available, unclassified data. Further detainee riskassessment information has reportedly been leaked to the public by
the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks. Vast amounts of other data are
available to those who will be making the determinations regarding
181
which detainees are released. This information has been collected
182
and made available to policymakers since early 2009.
3. Increased Use of Risk Assessment Leads to Lower
Recidivism Rates
Increased use of risk assessment in determining which detainees
will be released can lead to reduced recidivism in a variety of ways.
First, and most directly, by culling out the detainees who pose the
greatest risk of recidivism, the overall incidence of recidivism will
decline. Under such a scenario, the review process will determine in
each case if the risk of recidivism is too high to warrant release.
Therefore, those most likely to reengage in terrorism or insurgency
against the United States or its allies will not be given the opportunity
to do so. This will lead to a lower incidence of such reengagement
overall.
This expected decline in recidivism has been born out so far,
according to the official information released about alleged
183
recidivists.
The latest DNI summary of recidivism among released
GTMO detainees claims that 15.9% of the 599 released detainees are

/CTC_csrt_rpt_20070725.pdf.
180
MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE EMPTY BATTLEFIELD AND THE THIRTEENTH
CRITERION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE’S RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE
GUANTÁNAMO DETENTIONS, available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Seton_Hall/
SH06_reply_to_DoD_20071108.pdf; Mark P. Denbeaux, Testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on C-SPAN: The Empty Battlefield and the Thirteen Criterion
(Nov. 8, 2007).
181
GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ii, 56 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
182
Id.
183
See app. A.8.
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“confirmed” to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities, and
184
The DNI summary,
another 12% are suspected of doing so.
however, makes clear that this rate is largely historical. Executive
Order 13492, requiring a “comprehensive interagency review”
including “full assessment of intelligence and threat information,”
185
was promulgated on January 22, 2009.
Those detainees released
prior to January 22, 2009 have had a reportedly high recidivism rate
with 17.3% confirmed and 13.2% suspected, while the recidivism rate
plummeted by more than three quarters for those released after this
186
date to 4.5% confirmed and 3% suspected.
Additionally, the Center’s own study of detainee recidivism
shows that 20% of detainees released prior to 2007 warrant a negative
187
assessment compared to only 12.6% of detainees released later.
While this measure is crude, and does not take into account the
expected lag between release and reengagement, it comports with
188
the findings of the DNI.
Second, and less directly, by particularizing the nature of the risk
in each individual case, the risk assessment process can be used to
inform the handling of the detainee in the post-detention period.
The law enforcement and intelligence community can better allocate
resources tracking released detainees. If this information is shared
with our foreign partners, then rehabilitation and reintegration
programs can be better targeted to the individual detainee in order
to further reduce the risk of that detainee rejoining the fight. Lastly,
the information produced in the risk assessment process may be used
to create or improve other means of reducing the individual or group
184

Id.
Id.
186
Id. The 2009 summary also notes that the average delay between release and
recidivism is 2.5 years. This delay may account in part to this low rate, but given that
more than 2.5 years have passed since January 22, 2009, this effect cannot be the
whole story. Even if this rate doubles over time, the more than 2:1 disparity between
pre- and post-January 22, 2009 recidivism is stark. See app. A.5.
187
This percentage most likely overestimates recidivism among those released
using risk-based procedures since the interagency review process was only put in
place by Executive Order 13492 on January 22, 2009, and the Periodic Review Boards
(which only release detainees who do not pose a “significant threat to the security of
the United States”) were not put in place until 2011. Review and Disposition of
Individuals Detained At the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention
Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Periodic
Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,3821
(Jan. 18, 2011).
188
A more complete analysis accounting for these problems will be produced at a
later time.
185
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risk of recidivism.
Third, proper risk assessment procedures that estimate the
likelihood of engagement in high- and low-damage activities
independent of one another will allow further granulation of the
targeting noted above. In doing so, it will lower the risk of highly
damaging activities, reducing the risk to U.S. interests in the broader
sense.
Recidivism rates of detainees released between 2002 and 2006
represent a statistical worst-case scenario. Because risk assessment
was not applied in any cognizable form, the effect on recidivism rates
was similar to the release of random detainees. With no distinction
drawn between high-risk and low-risk detainees, the recidivism rate
for this early group will be higher than any subsequent group
applying a risk assessment.
Recidivism rates for those released based on some form of risk
assessment will be reduced by limiting the number of high-risk
releases, as is clear from the stark disparity in recidivism between
Bush-era and Obama-era releases. In addition, the risk assessment
process can aid in prevention by providing information to law
enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, and foreign
partners who are involved in handling former detainees.
VII. MISSION CREEP: RECIDIVISM BY ENGAGEMENT IN OTHER
CONFLICTS
Under any of the various characterizations of recidivism, from
“return to the battlefield” to the DNI’s current definition of
“reengagement,” only those actions that are hostile to U.S. interests
should concern U.S. policymakers. This is evident in the DNI
definition, which restricts reengagement to acts against “coalition or
189
host-nation forces or civilians.”
Other activity is outside the scope
of the War on Terror. Unfortunately, this grouping is vague and
prone to expansion, as explained above. Additionally, many of the
alleged recidivists reflect this expansive tendency.

189

See app. A.8.
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Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of alleged recidivists who
were transferred or released to various countries, as provided by the
government and independently discovered by the Center,
respectively. All of the detainees in each chart were citizens of the
countries to which they were sent with one exception: a Yemeni
citizen listed among the government’s thirty-one was sent to Saudi
Arabia following his release from GTMO. Additionally, two Afghanis
had dual citizenship: one Afghani was also British, and another
Afghani was Bangladeshi. Because of the small sample size of the
government’s list, the combined list of those alleged by the
government and those found by the Center will be used unless stated
190
otherwise (See Figure 3).
The majority of alleged recidivists have been sent to either
Afghanistan (32%) or Saudi Arabia (28%) following their release
from GTMO. Detainees sent to Russia, however, are statistically the
most likely to be recidivists. Five of the seven detainees (71%) sent to
Russia appear to have reengaged in hostile acts.
As is clear in Figure 4, not all countries to which detainees were
sent contributed equally to the group of alleged recidivists.
Afghanistan is a clear contributor with over 30% of alleged recidivists
(See Figure 3). But this actually overstates its role in recidivism. In
fact, with only fifteen alleged recidivists among its 202 returned
detainees, Afghanistan’s recidivism rate is a mere 7% (See Figure 5).
Indeed, under the DoD’s understanding of recidivism in which only
“confirmed” recidivists should be counted, this rate drops to less than
2% (4 of 202). This is surprising, given that these individuals are
returned directly to the state in which the war is being conducted.
Following this logic, looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan together
results in a “battlefield” recidivism rate of only 1.88% (5 of 266).

190

To facilitate comparison this Section will use HASC’s more inclusive
understanding of recidivism, combining suspected and confirmed recidivism. See
LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELLETE)

4/11/2013 7:4
43 PM

680

[Vol. 43:643

Fig. 4: Rele
ease and Reccidivism -- Peercent of Wh
hole
Percen
nt of
Confirrme
d Nam
mes

Other

Britain

Algeria

Albania

Turkey

Tajikistan
j

Sweden

Denmark

Bahrain

Yemen

Pakistan

Kuwait

o occo
Morocco

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Percen
nt of
All
Named
d
Recidiivists

Afghanistan

40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

SETON HA
ALL LAW RE
EVIEW

Percen
nt of
All
Releassed

qually surpriising are Saaudi Arabia and Russia. Saudi Araabia
Eq
stands out as ano
other major contributorr, comprisin
ng 28% of the
d recidivists. Russia, whille not contriibuting very large numbeers,
alleged
is the third largest, and has the
t
highest rate of alleeged recidiviism
191
e. Neitherr Saudi Arabiia nor Russia, however, is a
(71%) of the three
nizable part of the “batttlefield.” IIn fact, all o
of the Russsian
recogn
recidiviists committted their acts
a
of reciidivism in Russia agaiinst
19
92
Russian
ns or the Ru
ussian state.
Many Am
mericans mayy question h
how
such examples
e
of clearly dom
mestic terro rism fit into
o the strateegic
interests of the Uniited States.
Fig. 5: Re
elease and Recidivism
R
-- P
Percent of W
Whole

191

Other

Britain

Algeria

Albania

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Tajikistan

Yemen

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Kuwait

Turkey

Morocco
M

Russia

Sweden

Allege
ed
Perce
ent
of
Releaased

Denmark

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Denmark and Sweden have hiigher recidivism
m rates, each aat 100%. See iinfra
Figure 5. However, onlly one detainee
e has been releaased to each.
192
Seee app. A.4.

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELLETE)

2013]

4/11/2013 7:4
43 PM

NATIO
ONAL SECUR
URITY DESER
RVES BETTE
ER

681

No
or is it cle
ear that th
he alleged recidivism is in geneeral
reengaagement with
h the United
d States or its Coalition
n partners. Of
the tw
welve countries from which
w
goveernment-alleged recidivvists
originaate, two (Sau
udi Arabia and
a
Tajikistaan) are not listed as eith
her
193
membe
ers of the Coalition
C
(aaccording to
o CENTCO
OM) or ISAF
F.
Anothe
er two (Yem
men and Mo
orocco) havve provided no cognizaable
194
supporrt to the U.S..-led Coalitio
on at war in A
Afghanistan..
Fig. 6: Number of Countries
C
with
h Recidivists
Baased on Type of Support Prrovided
OEF/
/ISAF
5

Overfligh
ht/
Humanitarrian
2

No
n
Contribution
2

Afghanisstan 1
Non
n-Coalition
2

Off the remain
ning eight co
ountries from
m which alleeged recidivvists
195
originaate, two (Ru
ussia and Kuw
wait) provid
de only miniimal supporrt.
Accord
ding to CEN
NTCOM, Ru
ussia provid
ded humaniitarian supp
port
196
early in
n the war. For examplle, it built a pontoon briidge in 2002
2 to
197
aid in the
t delivery of supplies from
f
Tajikisstan. It alsso establisheed a

193

Coalition
C
Countries,
U.S.
CENT.
COMMA
AND,
http://w
www.centcom.m
mil/en/countries/coalition (llast visited Marr. 19, 2013); T
Troop
Numbers and Contribbutions, AFGHA
ANISTAN INT’L SECURITY A SSISTANCE FORCE,
www.isaf.nato.in
nt/troop-numb
bers-and-contrib
butions/index.p
php (last vissited
http://w
Mar. 19, 2013).
194
Ye
emen may be included in th
his Coalition iif it is interpreeted to mean the
broader,, worldwide waar on al Qaedaa, since it is geenerally believeed that the Un
nited
States has
h repeatedly conducted drrone strikes in
n Yemen with its governmeent’s
approvall. The same lo
ogic, however, would includee Somalia in th
he Coalition, siince
the Unitted States has reportedly
r
conducted several drone strikes in Somalia agaainst
al Qaedaa-affiliated targe
ets.
195
DOD FACT SHEET
T, supra note 72
2.
196
Id
d.; Support to thee Global War on
n Terror (Operati
tion Enduring Fr
Freedom), U.S. CEENT.
COMMAN
ND
[hereinaffter
Supportt
to
the
Global
Waar
on
Terrror],
http://w
www.centcom.m
mil/russia/ (last visited Mar. 1 9 2013).
197
Su
upport to the Global War on Terroor, supra note 1 96.

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELLETE)

4/11/2013 7:4
43 PM

682

[Vol. 43:643

SETON HA
ALL LAW RE
EVIEW

198

hospitaal later in 20
002, but hass since proviided no further supporrt.
Kuwait, meanwhile
e, has provid
ded only bas ing and porrt facilities, aand
1
199
even th
his is at best only
o
indirecttly linked to the war in A
Afghanistan.
Fig
g. 7: Number of
o Confirmed
d Recidivists
Based
B
on Typ
pe of Support Provided
OEF
F/ISAF
3

Overflight/
/
Humanitariaan
3

No
Contributtion
2
Afghanisstan 4
Non-Coaltiion
3

his leaves on
nly five state
es aside fro
om Afghanisstan itself frrom
Th
which recidivists originated:
o
Bahrain,
B
Deenmark, Pakkistan, Turk
key,
200
and Sw
weden.
In
nterestingly, of these, on
nly Turkey h
has contribu
uted
201
ISAF Troops
T
since 2007, and
d none of th
hese states h
has contribu
uted
troops to the OEF (non-NATO
O) mission in
n Afghanistaan since at leeast
202
2
2003.
Evven though a plurality of
o the states from which
h recidivists h
hail
were co
ontributing members off the U.S.-led
d Coalition iin Afghanisttan,
these states contrib
buted only a remarkablyy small numb
ber of the to
otal
er of confirm
med recidivvists. The laargest group
p of recidivvists
numbe
comes from Afghaanistan itselff, with a totaal of four reecidivists. T
The
hose from sttates that prrovided littlee or
next laargest group contains th
no con
ntribution to
o the Coalitiion. Anotheer three are citizens of the
198

Russia,
R
U.S. CEN
NT. COMMAND, http://www.c
centcom.mil/ru
ussia/ (last vissited
Mar. 19, 2013).
199
Kuwait,
K
U.S. CEN
NT. COMMAND, http://www.ce
entcom.mil/ku
uwait/ (last vissited
Mar. 19,, 2013) (noting
g Kuwaiti basin
ng and port faacilities supporrt actions taken
n to
combat instability
i
in the Arabian Peniinsula).
200
Seee supra Figure 3.
3
201
ISSAF Placemat Archives, AFGH
HANISTAN INT’ L SECURITY A SSISTANCE FORCE,
http://w
www.isaf.nato.in
nt/isaf-placemaat-archives.htmll (last visited M
Mar. 19, 2013).
202
Operation
Op
End
during Freedom
m—Order of
Battle, GLO
OBALSECURITY.O
ORG,
http://w
www.globalsecurity.org/militarry/ops/endurin
ng-freedom_orrbat-01.htm (last
visited Mar.
M 19, 2013).

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/11/2013 7:43 PM

NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER

683

non-coalition member Saudi Arabia. Only three of the confirmed
recidivists come from troop-contributing Coalition partners other
than Afghanistan. Even including suspected recidivists and those
discovered by the Center, only six alleged recidivists come from
troop-contributing Coalition partners other than Afghanistan.
The United States clearly should take care to avoid unnecessary
burdens to all of its neighbors in the international community. This
includes returning to them detainees known to pose a significant risk
of engaging in hostilities, the distribution of nationalities of those
alleged to have “returned to the fight” or “reengaged” in hostilities in
the Global War on Terror. This, therefore, raises the question: How
far afield does this war range?
Many Americans believe that, while the situation in Afghanistan
and Pakistan warrants inclusion within the United States’ war on al
Qaeda and the Taliban, situations such as those found in Turkey,
Russia, and Saudi Arabia are more appropriately handled by those
states’ own law enforcement agencies. The U.S. government has not
yet articulated its reasons for implicitly including such a broad array
of nations within the ambit of its definition of the Coalition, nor has
it explained its inclusion of acts of domestic terrorism or criminality
with no apparent connection to Afghanistan or the United States
within the definition of “reengagement” in the war. Such a failure
leaves policymakers with poorly defined parameters in which to
determine how to best guide the nation through this quandary.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is unclear what value a government report focusing solely on
negative behavior of released-detainees has beyond propaganda. If
the government wished to engage in an analysis of post-release
behavior of detainees, in order to determine future policy, it would
require an examination of both recidivists and non-recidivists. As this
is not the path the government has taken, it is clear that the
identification and reports on recidivisms exist to support the
decisions of the government both in GTMO and in the War on
Terror. Until the government (1) identifies and examines the
recidivists and their characteristics, and (2) acknowledges that there
are many detainees who live peaceful, private, non-recidivist lives, the
policies applied to the release of current detainees will remain
insufficient.
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APPENDIX A
The DoD has released eight public statements of recidivism
numbers including four lists of allegedly recidivist detainees. Those
eight documents are either reproduced or linked to in this Appendix
as follows:
A.1—July 10, 2006
A.2—July 7, 2007
A.3—May 20, 2008
A.4—June 13, 2008
A.5—April 7, 2009
A.6—December 7, 2010
A.7—September 13, 2011
A.8—March 5, 2012
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APPENDIX A.2

The following is an exact reproduction of the Department of
Defense news release of July 12, 2007, titled “Former Guantánamo
Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight.” This press release was
accessible
as
of
November
26,
2007
at
http://defenselink.mil.news/d20070712formergtmo.pdf, but has
since been removed without comment.

Former Guantánamo Detainees who have returned to the fight:
Our reports indicate that at least 30 former GTMO detainees have
taken part in anti-coalition militant activities after leaving U.S.
detention. Some have subsequently been killed in combat in
Afghanistan.
These former detainees successfully lied to U.S. officials, sometimes
for over three years. Many detainees later identified as having
returned to fight against the U.S. with terrorists falsely claimed to be
farmers, truck drivers, cooks, small‐scale merchants, or low‐level
combatants.
Other common cover stories include going to Afghanistan to buy
medicines, to teach the Koran, or to find a wife. Many of these stories
appear so often, and are subsequently proven false that we can only
conclude they are part of their terrorist training.
Although the U.S. government does not generally track ex‐GTMO
detainees after repatriation or resettlement, we are aware of dozens
of cases where they have returned to militant activities, participated
in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence
gathering and media reports. (Examples: Mehsud suicide bombing in
Pakistan; Tipton Three and the Road to Guantánamo; Uighurs in
Albania)
The following seven former detainees are a few examples of the 30;
each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies after being
released from Guantánamo.
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Mohamed Yusif Yaqub AKA Mullah Shazada:
After his release from GTMO on May 8, 2003, Shazada
assumed control of Taliban operations in Southern
Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included
the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar,
and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin
Boldak. Shazada was killed on May 7, 2004 while fighting
against U.S. forces. At the time of his release, the U.S. had
no indication that he was a member of any terrorist
organization or posed a risk to U.S. or allied interests.
Abdullah Mehsud:
Mehsud was captured in northern Afghanistan in late 2001
and held until March of 2004. After his release he went
back to the fight, becoming a militant leader within the
Mehsud tribe in southern Waziristan. We have since
discovered that he had been associated with the Taliban
since his teen years and has been described as an al Qaidalinked facilitator. In mid-October 2004, Mehsud directed
the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers in Pakistan.
During rescue operations by Pakistani forces, a kidnapper
shot one of the hostages. Five of the kidnappers were killed.
Mehsud was not among them. In July 2007, Mehsud carried
out a suicide bombing as Pakistani Police closed in on his
position. Over 1,000 people are reported to have attended
his funeral services.
Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar:
After being captured in early 2002 and held at GTMO for
eight months, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s
regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces,
carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On
September 25, 2004, while planning an attack against
Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a
raid by Afghan security forces.
Mohammed Ismail:
Ismail was released from GTMO in 2004. During a press
interview after his release, he described the Americans
saying, “they gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very
nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his
interview saying he would have to find work once he
finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four
months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S.
forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ismail
carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member
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in good standing.
Abdul Rahman Noor:
Noor was released in July of 2003, and has since
participated in fighting against U.S. forces near Kandahar.
After his release, Noor was identified as the person in an
October 7, 2001, video interview with al-Jazeerah TV
network, wherein he is identified as the “deputy defense
minister of the Taliban.” In this interview, he described the
defensive position of the mujahideen and claimed they had
recently downed an airplane.
Mohammed Nayim Farouq:
After his release from U.S. custody in July 2003, Farouq
quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaida
members and has since become re-involved in antiCoalition militant activity.
Ruslan Odizhev:
Killed by Russian forces June 2007, shot along with another
man in Nalchik, the capital of the tiny North Caucasus
republic of Kabardino‐Balkaria. Odizhev, born in 1973, was
included in a report earlier this year by the New York‐based
Human Rights Watch on the alleged abuse in Russia of
seven former inmates of the Guantánamo Bay prison after
Washington handed them back to Moscow in 2004.
As the facts surrounding the ex-GTMO detainees indicate, there is an
implied future risk to U.S. and allied interests with every detainee
who is released or transferred.
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APPENDIX A.6
DNI SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
DECEMBER 7, 2010
SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent
with direction in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L.
111-259, Section 334, which states:
“The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an
unclassified summary of (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or
formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will
engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist
organizations.”
(1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or
formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense
As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees have been transferred out of
Department of Defense (DoD) custody at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility. The Intelligence Community assesses
that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer. Of the 150
former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging
in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that
13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large.
On 22 January 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13492, calling for
a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently
detained at Guantanamo Bay. Every decision to transfer a detainee to a
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foreign country under this review was made after a full assessment of
intelligence and threat information. Since the implementation of Executive
Order 13492 and under the enhanced interagency review process, 66 of the
598 detainees noted above have been transferred. Of those 66 individuals
transferred since January 2009, 2 are confirmed and 3 are suspected of
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities.
(2a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in
terrorism
The Intelligence Community assesses that the number of former detainees
identified as reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity will increase. A
February 2010 review of GTMO detainees’ release dates compared to first
reporting of confirmed or suspected reengagement shows about 2.5 years
between leaving GTMO and the first identified reengagement reports.
Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence
Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from
GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities.
(2b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate
with persons in terrorist organizations
It is not unusual for former GTMO detainees to communicate with persons
in terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the
mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious
(planning future terrorist operations). Correspondingly, the Intelligence
Community assesses that additional former GTMO detainees will
communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Based on trends
identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further
assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of
them will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.
Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities
For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following indicate
involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations,
conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation
forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist
operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for
movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc. It does not
include mere communications with individuals or organizations— including
other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist
operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO,
communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities,
writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda
statements.
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Reporting Qualifications for “Confirmed”
A preponderance of information identifying a specific former GTMO
detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the
purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or
propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.
Reporting Qualifications for “Suspected”
Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific
former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent
activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S.
statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.
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APPENDIX B
GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETAINEES ALLEGEDLY RELEASED
AND SUBSEQUENTLY RE-CAPTURED OR KILLED
IN COMBAT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
TIME LINE OF NUMBERS CITED PUBLICLY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:
GOVT.
OFFICIAL:

DATE:

# CITED:

QUOTE:

Sep. 13,
2011

161

James Clapper,
Director of
National
Intelligence

“There are, I think, some 161—there
have been 599 detainees that have
been repatriated from Guantanamo;
some 161 of them either confirmed or
suspected to be recidivists. I should
point out, many of them have been
taken off the battlefield through
kinetic encounters, if you will. So that
is a concern.”

Dec.
2010

150

James Clapper,
Director of
National
Intelligence

“As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees
have been transferred out of
Department of Defense (DoD) custody
at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility.
The Intelligence Community assesses
that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed
and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent
activities after transfer. Of the 150
former GTMO detainees assessed as
confirmed or suspected of reengaging
in terrorist or insurgent activities, the
Intelligence Community assesses that
13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83
remain at large.”

Feb.
2010

112

John Brennan,
President
Obama’s chief
counterterrorism
adviser

According to the most recent report to
Congress pursuant to section 319 of
the Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 2009, the Intelligence Community
assesses that 20 percent of detainees
transferred from Guantanamo are
confirmed or suspected of recidivist
activity.
This figure includes 9.6
percent of detainees who are
confirmed recidivists and 10.4 percent
of detainees who the Intelligence
Community suspects, but is not certain,
may have engaged in recidivist
activities.
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7,

74

Defense
Department

“Based on a comprehensive review of
available information as of mid-March
2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency
reported that 14 percent of the overall
rate of former Guantanamo detainees
confirmed or suspected of reengaging
in terrorist activities. Of the more than
530 Guantanamo detainees transferred
from Department of Defense custody
at Guantanamo Bay, 27 were
confirmed and 47 were suspected of
reengaging
in
terrorist
activity.
Between December 2008 and March
2009, nine detainees were added to the
confirmed list, six of whom were
previously on the suspected list.”

Jan. 13,
2009

61

Geoff Morrell,
Pentagon
spokesman

“I can disclose with you the fact that we
have a new—we have updated
recidivism numbers of people who
have been at Guantanamo, and these
are the latest numbers we have as of
the end of December. And it shows a
pretty
substantial
increase
in
recidivism. I think prior to this report,
I think the rate had been about 7
percent of those who had been held at
Guantanamo and released who have
been confirmed or suspected of
returning to the fight. At that time we
suspected that 30—confirmed or
suspected that 37 former detainees had
returned to the fight. We now believe
that that number has increased and
that the overall known terrorist
reengagement rate has increased to 11
percent. The new numbers are, we
believe, 18 confirmed and 43 suspected
of returning to the fight. So 61 in all
former Guantanamo detainees are
confirmed or suspected of returning to
the fight.”

June
2008

37

Defense
Department

“A DIA report dated May 12, 2008 cites
the figure of 36 ex-GTMO men
“confirmed or suspected” of having
returned to terrorism. . . with Kuwaiti
ex-detainee Abdallah Salih Al-Ajmi’s
confirmation of suicide bombing in
Iraq, the figure is 37. The number of
former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO)
detainees confirmed or suspected of
returning to terrorist activities is about
7 percent of those transferred from
U.S. custody. The identified rate of

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/11/2013 7:43 PM

App. B

[Vol. 43:643

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

reengagement over three years of
tracking has remained relatively
constant between 5 and 8 percent.”
209

May 09,
2007

*Approx.
30

Rear Admiral
Harry B. Harris
Jr. (USN),
Commander,
Joint Task Force
Guantanamo

“Of those detainees transferred or
released, we believe approximately 30
have returned to the fight.”

Apr. 26,
2007

*Approx.
30

Daniel J.
Dell’Orto,
Principal
Deputy General
Counsel Dept.
of Def.

“The General number is around—just
short of 30, I think”
“It’s a combination of 30 we believe
have either been captured or killed on
the battlefield, so some of them have
actually died on the battlefield.”

Apr. 17,
2007

24

Michael F.
Scheuer,
Former Chief,
Bin Laden Unit,
C.I.A.

“But the rub comes with the release,
and that is where we are going to
eventually have to come down and sit
down and do some hard talking, as the
Europeans said, because we have had
already two dozen of these people
come back from Guantanamo Bay and
either be killed in action against us or
recaptured.”

Mar. 29,
2007

**At
210
Least 29

Patrick F.
Philbin,
Associate
Deputy
Attorney, U.S.
Dept. of Justice

“The danger that these detainees
potentially pose is quite real, as has
been demonstrated by the fact that to
date at least 29 detainees released from
Guantanamo re-engaged in terrorist
activities, some by rejoining hostilities
in Afghanistan where they were either
killed or captured on the battlefield.”

Mar. 08,
2007

12

Senator Lindsey
Graham (SC)

“Twelve of the people released have
gone back to the fight, have gone back
to trying to kill Americans and
civilians.”

Mar. 06,

**At Least

Sr. Defense

“I can tell you that we have confirmed

209
* “Approx.” indicates the specific language used was an approximation; the
specific number cited was used contextually with qualifying language. See “QUOTE”
column for actual qualifying language used within the immediate textual area of the
number cited.
210
** “At Least” indicates that the phrase “at least” was used in connection with the
number provided; the number provided is therefore a baseline, or the lowest
number possible.
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2007

12–24

Official

12 individuals have returned to the
fight, and we have strong evidence that
about another dozen have returned to
the fight.”

Nov. 20,
2006

**At Least
12

Alberto R.
Gonzales, U.S.
Atty. Gen.

“As you may know, there have been
over a dozen occasions where a
detainee was released but then
returned to fight against the United
States and our allies again.”

Sept. 27,
2006

**At Least
10

Senator Jon Kyl
(AZ)

“According to a October 22, 2004 story
in the Washington Post, at least 10
detainees released from Guantanamo
have been recaptured or killed fighting
U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan
or Pakistan.”

Sept. 06,
2006

**At Least
12

President
George W. Bush

“Other countries have not provided
adequate
assurances
that
their
nationals will not be mistreated or they
will not return to the battlefield, as
more than a dozen people released
from Guantanamo already have.”

Aug. 02,
2006

*Approx.
25

Senator Arlen
Specter (PA)

“[A]s you know, we have several
hundred detainees in Guantanamo. A
number estimated as high as 25 have
been released and returned to the
battlefield, so that’s not a desirable
thing to happen.”

July 19,
2006

**At Least
10

Senator James
M. Inhofe

“At least 10 detainees we have
documented that were released in
Guantanamo, after U.S. officials
concluded that they posed no real
threat or no significant threat, have
been recaptured or killed by the U.S.
fighting and coalition forces, mostly in
Afghanistan.”

June 20,
2006

15

Senator Jeff
Sessions (AL)

“They have released several hundred
already, and 15 of those have been
rearrested on the battlefield where
they are presumably attempting to
fight the United States of America and
our soldiers and our allies around the
world.”

June 20,
2006

*Approx.
12

Senator Lindsey
Graham (SC)

“About a dozen of them have gone
back to the fight, unfortunately. So
there
have
been
mistakes
at
Guantanamo Bay by putting people in
prison that were not properly
classified.”
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May 25,
2006

*Approx.
10%
of
“hundreds”

John B.
Bellinger III,
Snr. Legal
Adviser, Sec. of
St. Condoleezza
Rice

“Roughly 10 percent of the hundreds
of individuals who have been released
from Guantanamo ‘have returned to
fighting us in Afghanistan,’ Bellinger
said.”

May 21,
2006

“A couple”

Condoleezza
Rice, U.S. Sec.
of St.

“[B]ecause the day that we are facing
them again on the battlefield— and, by
the way, that has happened in a couple
of cases that people were released
from Guantanamo.”

Mar. 28,
2006

*Approx.
12

U.S. Dept. of
Def.

“Approximately a dozen of the more
than 230 detainees who have been
released or transferred since detainee
operations started at Guantanamo are
known to have returned to the
battlefield.”

Mar. 07,
2006

**At Least
15

Alberto R.
Gonzales, U.S.
Atty. Gen.

“Unfortunately, despite assurances
from those released, the Department
of Defense reports that at least 15 have
returned to the fight and been
recaptured or killed on the battlefield.”

Feb.14,
2006

*Approx.
15

U.S. Embassy in
Tirana - Albania

“Unfortunately, of those already
released from Guantanamo Bay,
approximately fifteen have returned to
acts of terror and been recaptured.”

Jan. 10,
2006

12

Donald H.
Rumsfeld,
Defense
Secretary

Twelve detainees who’d been released
from Guantanamo had returned to the
battlefield and had been re-captured
by U.S. forces

July 21,
2005

*Approx.
12

Matthew
Waxman, Dep.
Ass. Sec. of Def.
for detainee
affairs

About a dozen individuals who were
released previously, he said, returned
to the battlefield “and tried to harm us
again.”

July 13,
2005

*Approx.
12

Gen. Bantz
Craddock,
Commander,
U.S. Southern
Command

“We believe the number’s 12 right
now—confirmed 12 either recaptured
or killed on the battlefield.”

July 08,
2005

*Approx.
12

Rear Adm.
James
McGarrah

“About a dozen of the 234 that have
been
released
since
detainee
operations started in Gitmo we know
have returned to the battlefield—about
a dozen.”

July 06,
2005

“A few”

Scott
McClellan,

“I mean, the President talked about
how these are dangerous individuals;
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White House
Press Sec.

they are at Guantanamo Bay for a
reason—they were picked up on the
battlefield. And we’ve returned a
number of those, some 200-plus, we’ve
returned a number of those enemy
combatants to their country of origin.
Some of—a few of them have actually
been picked up again fighting us on
the battlefield in the war on terrorism.”

July 06,
2005

**At Least
5

Anonymous
Defense
Official

“‘At least five detainees released from
Guantanamo have returned to the
(Afghan) battlefield,’ said the defense
official, who requested anonymity.”

June 27,
2005

12

Senator Jim
Bunning (KY)

“I could describe many individuals
held at Guantanamo and give reasons
they need to remain in our custody,
but I only will mention a few more_12,
to be exact. That is the number of
those we know who have been released
from Guantanamo and returned to
fight against the coalition troops.”

June 20,
2005

*Approx.
12

Scott
McClellan,
White House
Press Sec.

“I think that our belief is that about a
dozen or so detainees that have been
released from Guantanamo Bay have
actually returned to the battlefield, and
we’ve either recaptured them or
otherwise dealt with them, namely
killing them on the battlefield when
they were again attacking our forces.”

June 20,
2005

“Some”

President
George W. Bush

The president was quick to point out
that many of the detainees being held
“are dangerous people” who pose a
threat to U.S. security. Some of those
who have been released have already
returned to the battlefield to fight U.S.
and coalition troops, he said.

June 17,
2005

*Approx.
10

Vice President
Dick Cheney

“In some cases, about 10 cases, some of
them have then gone back into the
battle against our guys. We’ve had two
or three that I know of specifically by
name that ended up back on the
battlefield in Afghanistan where they
were killed by U.S. or Afghan forces.”

June 16,
2005

12

Congressman
Bill Shuster
(PA)

“In fact, about two-hundred of these
detainees have been released and it’s
been proven that twelve have already
returned to the fight.”

June 14,
2005

**At Least
10

Vice President
Dick Cheney

He provided new details about what he
said had been at least 10 released

DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/11/2013 7:43 PM

App. B

[Vol. 43:643

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

detainees who later turned up on
battlefields to try to kill American
troops.
June 13,
2005

**At Least
12

Scott
McClellan,
White House
Press Sec.

“There have been—and Secretary
Rumsfeld talked about this recently—
at least a dozen or so individuals that
were released from Guantanamo Bay,
and they have since been caught and
picked up on the battlefield seeking to
kidnap or kill Americans.”

June 06,
2005

“Some”

Air Force Gen.
Richard B.
Myers

“We’ve released 248 detainees, some of
whom have come back to the
battlefield, some of whom have killed
Americans after they have been
released.”

June 01,
2005

**At Least
12

Donald H.
Rumsfeld,
Defense
Secretary

“At least a dozen of the 200 already
released from GITMO have already
been caught back on the battlefield,
involved in efforts to kidnap and kill
Americans.”

Dec. 20,
2004

**At Least
12

Gordon
England,
Secretary of
The Navy

“And as you are aware, there’s been at
least 12 of the more than 200 detainees
that have been previously released or
transferred from Guantanamo that
have indeed returned to terrorism.”

Nov. 03,
2004

**At Least
10

Charles Douglas
“Cully”
Stimson, Dep.
Ass. Sec. of Def.
for Detainee
Affairs

Of the roughly 200 detainees the
United States has released from its
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention
facility, intelligence claims that at least
10 returned to terrorist activity, the
deputy assistant secretary of defense
for detainee affairs said here Nov. 2.

Oct. 19,
2004

“A couple”

Vice President
Dick Cheney

“And we have had a couple of instances
where people that were released, that
were believed not to be dangerous
have, in fact, found their way back onto
the battlefield in the Middle East.”

Oct. 17,
2004

**At Least
7

U.S. Military
Officials (as
reported by the
Assoc. Press)

“[A]t least seven former prisoners of
the United States at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, have returned to terrorism, at
times with deadly consequences.”

Mar. 25,
2004

1

Donald H.
Rumsfeld,
Defense
Secretary

“Now,
have
we
made
a
mistake? Yeah. I’ve mentioned earlier
that I do believe we made a mistake in
one case and that one of the people
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APPENDIX D: Government Figures for Recidivist Detainees
Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:
3/16/04 - 9/13/11

Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:
3/16/04 - 11/20/06
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Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:
3/06/07 - 9/13/11

